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If Jeremiah Is Going to Stay, He 
Needs to Change His Tone:
Reframing Apocalyptic Discourse
[ beRnaRd kondenaR ]
Coming soon to a neighborhood near you, the main event that is the end of the world has truly become an immanent presence in our 
modern lives. As calamities go, we have been promised quite the show, 
and this in spite of the fact that its approach is being heralded by some 
in a fastidiously mundane fashion—very much unlike the biblical prophet 
Jerimiah (from whom the term jeremiad derives its namesake), who 
vehemently warned his fellow citizens that their sins would invoke the wrath 
of God and assuredly lead to their destruction. Not to be confused with 
imminent, immanence refers to something that permanently dwells within 
us, remaining there, while being utterly and without qualification knowable 
to us as human beings. We blithely regale each other with narratives 
of our own collapse and extinction to such a degree that many of these 
tales have become ossified into inflexible fatalistic beliefs. Though usually 
reserved for more theistic venues, the immanence of the apocalypse has 
found new purchase in the hearts and minds of the masses. This uptick 
in a more secular fascination with our perhaps untimely end comes as 
no great surprise to some. In fact, “Today, about 41 percent of Americans 
believe that Jesus will either ‘definitely’ or ‘probably’ return by 2050, and 
comparable numbers of Muslims expect the world to end in their lifetimes.”1 
While these numbers are stunning, prophecy is no longer relegated to the 
purely theological.  A case in point, there are Singularitarians in Silicon 
Valley who believe a quasi-utopian state will occur by or before the year 
2045, thereby adding their voices to the growing chorus who warn that the 
singularity (the emergence of self-aware artificial intelligence) may be a 
greater existential threat than any we have ever faced before.2 However, 
    1    Guy P. Harrison, “Exploring Our Endless Obsession With the End,” Psychology 
Today, Febuary 17, 2016, https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/about-
thinking/201602/exploring-our-endless-obsession-the-end.
    2    Ibid.
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before we can contend with whatever potential admonitions our fearsome 
robot overlords might have in store, there is an even more contentious 
issue to deal with—namely, climate change.
Polluters pollute, environmentalists swoon, and the politicians wail, 
but still the band plays on. There is certainly no paucity of apocalyptic 
discourse when it comes to the problematic matter of climate change. On 
the subject of environmental awareness in particular, we can mark the 
diaspora of this type of rhetoric—from the pulpit to the public sphere—
by looking at one of the most influential environmental writers in recent 
history: Rachel Carson. Since her jeremiad about the dangers of 
pesticides, Silent Spring (1962), portents of the apocalyptic have served 
as a common rhetorical foundation for many environmental writers, 
journalists, scientists, and politicians—purportedly, in order to educate and 
foment their audiences into repenting of their evil ways and changing their 
behavior before it is too late. In the case of Carson, her haunting portrayal 
of a lifeless rural town struck down by the effects of environmental toxins 
would have made even the most puritanical practitioners of the jeremiad 
very proud indeed. However, as we will explore, our fascination with our 
own doom and the powerful rhetoric that goes along with it has its own set 
of unintended consequences. Nevertheless, we find that this fascination 
is deeply rooted in the human psyche and, as history will teach us, the 
jeremiad is very likely here to stay. Ultimately, (and hopefully before The 
End), what we hope to show is that we need to unreservedly spur people 
into action concerning the mitigation of climate change. In short, we need 
to reframe the apocalypse.
While we certainly employ a panacea of apocalyptic rhetoric and 
imagery in relation to climate change, the question remains: why does 
it persist? Despite a lack of evidence that it has directly inspired much 
meaningful action on behalf of the climate, a variety of disciplines have 
chimed in on why we, as human beings, are still so receptive to it. For 
example, Stanford political scientist Allison McQueen fully understands 
the temptation to use this kind of epistemological reductionism when 
explaining complex events or concepts that stymie a more conventional 
path of discourse.3 In her book, Political Realism in Apocalyptic Times, 
McQueen focuses on several centuries of political realists that criticized, 
but nevertheless to some extent embraced, apocalyptic rhetoric. Drawing 
on examples from as far back as Machiavelli and writing during the violent 
political upheavals of sixteenth-century Florence, McQueen builds her 
case that we use such rhetoric because “we have a need to understand 
events like war, natural disasters, economic collapse and looming nuclear 
    3    Kate Chesley, “Stanford Poltical Scientist Studies Apocalyptic Political Rhetoric,” 
Stanford News, December 29, 2017, https://news.stanford.edu/2017/12/29/political-
scientist-studies-apocalyptic-political-rhetoric/.
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conflagration. The causes of these things are complex. Apocalyptic rhetoric 
makes them easier to understand.”4 For Machiavelli, the use of apocalyptic 
rhetoric was a radical departure from an often measured and rules-based 
analytical style of events, and, in McQueen’s estimation, he only resorted to 
it due to an apparent failure to render the course of those events intelligible 
under a more conventional framework.
While McQueen chooses to recognize the correlation between 
turbulent historical events and the pursuant proliferation of apocalyptic 
rhetoric, she ultimately characterizes it as a dangerous tool, only 
begrudgingly used in order to help people who are seeking to understand 
these threats. However, professor of English and South African Studies 
Michael Titlestad elucidates on a slightly more ignoble motivation. In 
“The Logic of Apocalypse: A Clerical Rejoinder,” he concludes that “The 
hyperbolic inures us; the rhetoric of extremity, intended to defamiliarize 
a world obscured by complacency, has become routine. Horror, fear, 
and repulsion all induce a momentary affective turn, seducing us into 
longing for their reiteration. The truth of late modernity is that we love the 
apocalypse.”5 Here, Titlestad is referring to the countless reincarnations 
of apocalyptic rhetorical themes that have flooded theaters, inundated 
library shelves, and replaced that Old Testament fire and brimstone 
with incendiary political critique.6 Frankly, anyone who dares turn on the 
television at around five o’clock runs the risk of being habituated into this 
fantastical world of zombies, war, conquest, and ecological disaster—and 
that is just the evening news!  Both Titlestad and McQueen call into question 
the efficacy (as a call to action) and warn of the dangers inherent in the 
usage of apocalyptic language, but they also both recognize a persistent, 
widespread, and deep-seated psychological affinity for this message. 
This apparent need for apocalyptic discourse may indeed go beyond 
mere information seeking—as suggested by McQueen—or the somewhat 
lascivious sounding motivations in the diatribe proffered by Titlestad. In 
fact, writing only days before one of the last prognosticated end of the 
world events—namely, the much publicized and portentous misreading of 
the cyclical Mayan calendar ending on December 21, 2012—contributing 
science writer for Scientific American Daisy Yuhas stated, “It’s not the 
first ‘end is nigh’ proclamation—and it’s unlikely to be the last. That is 
because, deep down, there’s something appealing—at least to some of 
us—about the end of the world.”7 In her review, Yuhas draws on research 
    4    Ibid.
    5    Michael Titlestad,“The Logic of the Apocalypse: A Clerical Rejoinder,” The Journal of 
South African and American Studies, 14 (2013), 14.
    6    Ibid.
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being conducted in multiple scientific disciplines to back up this statement. 
One of the works Yuhas uses is by University of Minnesota neuroscientist 
Shmuel Lissek’s work on the human fear system. Lissek links our “moth to 
the flame” type behavior—in response to doomsday proclamations—to an 
ancient and obdurate mechanism that has, over our evolutionary history, 
favored those with a better-safe-than-sorry lifestyle. According to Lissek, 
our primary and initial response to alarm is fear, simply because “This is 
the architecture with which we’re built.”8 However, instead of avoiding that 
fear as one might expect, Lissek believes that a measure of comfort can 
be found, in respect to these built-in mechanisms, through connecting with 
those intentionally stoking these fears—by, for instance, finding a group of 
like-minded fatalists; avoiding individual responsibility by attributing doom 
to some larger cosmic order; or even relieving the (relatively greater) 
anxiety of uncertainty by knowing exactly when the end will come. Lissek, 
in collaboration with National Institute of Mental Health neuroscientist 
Christian Grillon, characterizes this elevated state of anxiety as akin to 
someone knowing they will receive a painful electric shock at some point 
in the future, but they have no idea when. Lissek would argue that if that 
person could be sure that the shock would not come for ten years, ten 
minutes, or even ten seconds, they would invariably relax. Simply put, 
any anxiety arising from uncertainty is now gone. Yuhas concludes that 
“knowing when the end will come doesn’t appeal equally to everyone, of 
course—but for many of us it’s paradoxically a reason to stop worrying.”9 
This reaction marks a distinct departure from merely communicating the 
complexities that beguile and entertain our human brains.  Masquerading 
as certainty, and not as some kind of backfiring atavistic coping mechanism 
run amok, the apocalypse—at least for some—has become therapeutic.
While arguably valuable to our survival up to this point, this evolutionary 
tendency creates the perfect storm for environmental inaction. In their 
article, “The Tragedy of Cognition,” Dominic Johnson and Simon Levin 
attribute this lack of responsiveness to “environmental change being largely 
invisible, very long term, hypothetical, uncertain, and controversial.”10 In 
fact, because the mechanisms that manifest climate change lie largely 
outside of our immediate sensory perceptions, the authors suggest the 
possibility that the threat inherent in climate change could very well lie 
outside the realm of human comprehension. Compounding the problem 
is that almost all courses of remedial action require significant additional 
material and social capital without possessing any immediate sense of 
tangible returns on that investment. What we begin to realize, as well as 
    8    Ibid.
    9    Ibid. 
   10   Dominic Johnson and Simon Levin, ”The Tragedy of Cognition: Psychological 
Biases and Environmental Inaction,” Current Science 97, no. 11 (2009), 1594.
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experience for ourselves, is that the salience of an issue is often directly 
proportional to its degree of palpability to the human senses.11 Regrettably, 
we have to ask the question if there could ever be a more poignant irony 
than the calm and indifferent way we maintain the status quo in the face 
of certain death? Johnson and Levin are certainly not surprised. They 
surmise that, despite the outward appearance of a mercurial nature, we 
are, in actuality, hardwired to respond only to immediate threats that we can 
see, smell, hear, or touch—and therefore understand.
While enhanced understanding, enjoyment, and psychological 
wellbeing do seem to share a positive correlation to the profligate use of 
apocalyptic rhetoric, and while this may seem puzzling to most, according 
to professor of religion Lorenzo DiTommaso, this is actually a very 
commonplace contradiction that occurs when people internalize conflicting 
beliefs.12 DiTommaso, who has been researching groups of doomsday 
believers for his book, The Architecture of Apocalypticism, asserts that 
“problems have become so big, with no solutions in sight, that we no 
longer see ourselves able as human beings to solve these problems.”13 
DiTammaso contends that it is precisely this unmanageable complexity and 
inscrutability of the world’s problems the uniting factor among the radically 
disparate groups that he studies. Identifying these practically universal 
and difficult-to-reconcile beliefs, DiTommaso states, “the first [belief] is that 
there is something dreadfully wrong with the world of human existence 
today. On the other hand, there is a sense that there is a higher good 
or some purpose for existence, a hope for a better future.”14 Like Yuhas, 
DiTammaso believes that a certain degree of personal comfort can be 
achieved when anticipating a cosmic correction of biblical proportions—
essentially just wiping the slate clean. This type of apocalyptic discourse 
identified by professor of communication Michael Salvador as a “flood myth.” 
He estimates that this “largely undermines contemporary environmental 
discourse that attempts to generate public activism in addressing ecological 
problems, by replacing an emphasis on human efficacy with symbolic 
vindication and exchanging collective effort for individual survivalism.”15 
Writing for the journal Ecotheology, author Catherine Keller states, “These 
movements, or moods, some cryptoapocalyptic (not acknowledging their 
roots in biblical mythology), some retroapocalyptic (referring the present 
moment back to the bible’s precise predictions), tremble and trill to the 
    11   Ibid. 
    12  Stephanie Pappas, “The Draw of Doomsday: Why People Look Forward to the 
End,” Live Science, May 16, 2011, www.livescience.com/14179-doomsday-psychology-21-
judgment-day-apocalypse.html. 
    13   Ibid. 
    14   Ibid. 
    15   Michael Salvador and Todd Norton, “The Flood Myth in the Age of Global Climate 
Change,” Environmental Communication 5, no. 1 (2011), 47.
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prospect of imminent destruction.”16 This common thread, or what Author 
Phil Torres calls the “clash of eschatologies,” sinuously wends its way 
throughout our entire past; he believes that these disagreements about 
our collective fate has essentially served as the grist for the dialectical mill 
which has nourished every major conflict to date.17 In other words, we can 
all agree that humans will someday soon cease to exist, but, unfortunately, 
we forestall any lamentation of that fact in favor of spirited debate about 
just how it will occur.
Being unable to agree on what should be the correct ending to our 
story is not the only complication surrounding the use of language imbued 
with catastrophism. Titlestad argues that Doomsaying has transcended 
the literalists domain and is now an immanent presence. What this 
means is that instead of being an eventuality that is merely close at 
hand, apocalypse has literally become a part of who we are and how we 
make decisions. Titlestad claims that “we use these ends to make sense 
of the present. We project catastrophic conclusions, or read any signs 
of prospective collapse as metonyms in order to regulate or ignore the 
quotidian (with its complexities of agency, complicity of victims, inscrutable 
flows of capital and its facile configurations of power).”18 He also believes 
that by applying this uncritical rhetorical approach to these problems, we 
run the risk of compromised thinking, experience a loss of imagination 
and agency, and become either extremely apathetic or, conversely, violent 
to an extreme. McQueen echoes this sentiment of peril when she states, 
“apocalyptic rhetoric creates a false sense of moral clarity,” and further that 
“A doomsday mindset casts political conflicts as battles between ‘good’ 
and ‘evil,’ ‘us’ and ‘them,’ and ‘salvation’ and ‘destruction.’ Once we see 
ourselves as engaged in an ultimate battle against evil, we are often more 
willing to use terrible means—war, torture, genocide, nuclear annihilation-
to achieve our ends.” 19 This characterization of apocalyptic rhetoric takes 
us even farther afield from communicating urgency or complexity in colorful 
and easy to understand language. The implication here—especially with 
an issue like climate change—is that the things we do are no longer merely 
affected reactions to an external threat; instead, each thought we have, 
every decision we make, and each potential war we wage is the result of 
our interminably reinforced understanding that the apocalypse is decidedly 
inevitable and, indubitably, someone else’s fault.
Eliezer Yudkowsky, of the Machine Intelligence Research Institute, 
aptly syllogizes the folly of this fatalistic worldview ascribing nefarious and 
    16   Catherine Keller, “The Heat is On: Apocalyptic Rhetoric and Climate Change,” 
Ecotheology 7 (1999), 50.
    17   Harrison.
    18   Titlestad, 8.
    19   Chesley.
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villainous intent on others—due mostly to an entities’ a priori need of a 
place to further exploit—when he states, “If our extinction proceeds slowly 
enough to allow a moment of horrified realization, the doers of the deed will 
likely be quite taken aback when realizing that they have actually destroyed 
the world. Therefore, I suggest that if the Earth is destroyed, it will probably 
be by mistake.”20 The implication enshrined in Yudkowsky’s assertion is 
that, while most people think that methodologies for expert elicitation, 
reasonably conducted, will ineluctably arrive at some shared objective truth, 
and that institutions and individuals will act on rational decisions rooted 
in factual and scientifically credible information, Yudkowsky would argue, 
that the reality is faulty heuristics and bias. These biases will invariably 
intrude on our thinking at all levels of decision making—anywhere from 
where to get our morning coffee to the potential mass extinction of the 
human race. Johnson and Levin also address these psychological pitfalls 
when they point to the systemic deviations from rational choice theory that 
we see played out on a daily basis. Where rational choice theory assumes 
that entities will objectively weigh a broad selection of options and pick 
the best one, what often happens in the case of climate change is that 
maladaptive behaviors, “well established and widely replicated phenomena 
that are exhibited by mentally healthy adults,” lead people “to downplay the 
probability and danger of environmental change, and their role in it, while 
increasing their perceived incentives to maintain the status quo, and to 
blame problems on others.”21 In fact, when faced with a dizzyingly complex, 
and disconcertingly fluid, cognitive problem such as climate change, 
Johnson and Levin assert that “while such biases may have been adaptive 
heuristics that promoted survival and reproduction in the Pleistocene 
environment of our evolutionary past, in today’s world of technological 
sophistication, industrial power and mass societies, psychological biases 
can lead to disasters on an unprecedented scale.”22
One of the most salient and endemic of our faulty heuristics, that 
Yudowski discusses, is motivated skepticism, known alternatively as 
confirmation bias. When confirmation bias latently intrudes upon the 
investigation of climate change, Yudowski points to two reasons why it can 
be particularly destructive. First, one that we witness quite often is that, 
even when given identical evidence, two biased parties will often arrive 
at completely incongruous conclusions. While this is not inherently a bad 
thing, it becomes a serious impediment to forward progress when parties 
only accept evidence that is favorable to their own arguments. Second, and 
    20   Eliezer Yudkowsky, “Cognitive Biases Potentially Affecting Judgement of Global 
Risks,” in Global Catastrophic Risks, ed. Nick Bostrom (New York: Oxford University 
Press), 1.
    21   Johnson, 1593.
    22   Ibid.
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paradoxically, when parties have an extensive knowledge of logical flaws, 
they have a tendency to only use that knowledge when critiquing their 
opponents.23 This practice of divisiveness has become all too common in 
politics, media, organizations, and our scientific community as well. The 
widening gulf delineating contracting groups of ‘believers,’ and stagnant 
with the dampening effects of inaction, has many calling for a change. We 
can see this battle of semantics play out day after day in the discussion 
on climate change. Especially disconcerting to many is the equal time and 
weight allotted to virtually anyone who decides to step up to the podium. 
Our passionate pursuit of impartiality and generous allowances toward 
freedom of expression has brought us to a point where “It has become 
exceedingly difficult to distinguish between a legitimate discourse of 
emergency, and escapist movements which monger fear and misplace 
hope. In the meantime, the greenhouse skeptics and their conservative 
allies use ‘apocalypse’ as the privileged term of denigration, while scientists 
try to dissociate themselves from its onus of religion and inevitability. In 
other words, in the civil debates, everyone disowns apocalypse.”24
As we have seen, “everyone disowns apocalypse,” may be the 
ultimate in hyperbolic misnomers—even outstripping what passes for 
a ‘civil debate’ nowadays. Speaking specifically of politics, Titlestad 
addresses this contradiction when he states, 
[T]here is an uncanny resemblance between the ways in 
which the left and the right use apocalyptic logic. Both seek 
opportunity at the limit, whether theoretical or economic. Both 
advance themselves through catastrophe, and both render 
the world in hysterical, noisy terms. Both seek, through their 
jeremiads, to awaken their auditors to the truth and new 
opportunities. Both trade in a worn currency of myth.25 
For those with the best intentions at heart, like Rachel Carson, apocalyptic 
rhetoric was intended to be used as a device to incentivize change in 
patterns of behavior that needed to be, and could be, changed by mutual 
agreement—doing so by previewing the potential fruits of inaction.26 
One irreconcilable problem, according to Breton and Hammond (2016), 
is that “Rather than offering any historic transformation or metaphysical 
salvation, environmental apocalyptism is an expression of the current post-
political and post-democratic condition, in which ideological or disensual 
contestation and struggles are replaced by techno-managerial planning, 
    23   Yudkowsky, 9-10.
    24   Keller, 49.
    25   Titlestad, 13.
    26   Salvador, 48.
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expert management and administration.” Further, “in its insistence that the 
future human society must be guided by [the science of] climate change, 
it perforce closes off any space for democratic debate or disagreement.”27 
This facts-only approach wholly neglects our social and psychological 
needs. While economists, politicians, and those in the natural sciences 
may be loath to relinquish this intentionally (possibly disingenuous) 
dispassionate approach, the time has come for policy makers to willfully 
look beyond the data and holistically embrace the prospective solutions.
 So, what else lies on the horizon besides our imminent doom? In the 
words of Keller, “There is no getting out of it. Apocalypse is part of the cultural 
atmosphere we breathe—thus climate and text heat up together.” What we 
have found is, much like what Foust and Murphy discovered in their critical 
analysis of US elite and popular press coverage of global warming, where 
apocalyptic rhetoric overwhelmingly maintained a presence throughout the 
selections.28 Also, in the words of Keller, “since we cannot erase the texts, 
we must not leave its interpretation in the hands of fundamentalists.”29 
Fundamentalists, for our purposes here, shall be defined as anyone falling 
into the first of two camps identified by Foust and Murphy: 1) adherents to a 
tragic apocalypse who see climate change as nothing short of deterministic, 
which, as we have seen, has a severe dampening effect on human agency 
and innovation, and 2) those who are more in alignment with the comic 
apocalyptic framing, or those who believe it is within our power to alter the 
course of events and thereby avert disaster. When considering the second 
group, it begs the question: as we stand little chance of ever escaping the 
seductive pull of the jeremiad, and—for that matter—slipping from the surly 
bonds of earth and our primordial connection to it, why not capitalize on our 
psychological, behavioral, and cognitive needs to regain some semblance 
of control over our collective fate?
We propose that it is this distinction between the tragic and the comic 
frames that makes it possible to hope for an overwhelming adoption of the 
comic apocalyptic frame—a hope we share with Foust and Murphy who 
expressed  it would “inspire approaches to communication about global 
warming that empower the public to overcome barriers to individual and 
collective agency, enabling them to become advocates for and participants 
in, global warming mitigation.”30 A 2005 study that tested the appeal of 
messages denoting action on climate change showed that respondents 
    27   Hugh Ortega Breton and Phil Hammond, “Eco-apocalypse: Environmentalism, 
political alienation and therapeutic agency,” in The Apocalypse in Film, by Karen Ritzenhoff 
and Angela Krewani (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016), 4.
    28   Christina R. Foust and William O’Shannon Murphy, “Revealing and Reframing 
Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse,” Environmental Communication 3 
(2009), 151-167.
    29   Keller, 57.
    30   Foust, 152.
9
Kondenar: Reframing Apocalyptic Discourse
Published by Lake Forest College Publications, 2019
preferred action that would be considered “doing good” over those 
that appealed to “logic and responsibility.” Moser, who cited the study, 
points to positive psychologists’ confirmation that living a meaningful 
life far outweighs any abstract appeals to logic—a faculty in which we 
are demonstrably deficient in anyhow.31 In other words, and contrary to 
arbiters of doom everywhere, we are not particularly predisposed to sit 
around resigned on the sidelines, waiting for God, nature, or some event 
that will wipe the slate clean and allow us a do-over. We are fundamentally 
social creatures that would do well to remember that we depend on each 
other for our own physical, psychic, and social survival.
“Apocalypse means unveiling, disclosure. So, we had better tease 
its contemporary incarnations out of their bitter sense of closure, toward 
their own disclosing potential.”32  Sounds easy, right? It is not. Setting 
aside the undesired effects of tragic apocalyptic rhetoric—for instance, 
a paralyzing sense of apathy, loss of agency, wanting to kill those who 
disagree with you, etc.—designing a grand positive vision for the future of 
humankind is definitely no walk in the park. Anyone who has studied the 
mountains of information out there on the implications of climate change 
could attest to this fact.  Lacking such a vision, we have relied heavily on 
ancient rhetorical techniques that primarily invoke feelings of division, guilt 
and fear. One could ask the question, is this really the foundation on which 
we would like our future to be built? On the other hand, considering the 
urgency and complexity of the situation, it is difficult to judge too harshly 
those who have—out of desperation—used apocalyptic rhetoric to reach a 
world oblivious to its own downward spiral. Moser suggests that “a grand 
positive vision may well be something that no one creates but eventually 
emerges out of a myriad of images, stories, and on-the-ground efforts in 
developing alternatives (lifestyles, technologies, behaviors, environments, 
communities, institutions, etc.)”33 Such a compelling vision could better 
fulfill the utility, entertainment value, and patronage to our savage sides 
than tragic apocalyptic ever has—and without the embarrassing side-
effects of wantonly killing us all.  I think if we distill down Moser’s last 
quotation, what she is actually saying is that there is no magic bullet and 
it is going to require contributions from us all to solve our little problem. 
However, judging by the comprehensive scope of those who dabble in the 
end of the world, we may be well on our way to that vision already—we 
just need to reframe it.
    31   Suzanne C. Moser, “More Bad News: The Risk of Neglecting Emotional Responses 
To Climate Change Information,” in Creating a Climate For Change: Communicating 
Climate Change and Facilitating Social Change, ed. Suzanne C. Moser and L. Dilling 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 74-75.
    32   Keller, 58.
    33   Moser, 75.
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